On March 30, President Donald Trump threatened to “blow up” all of Iran’s desalinationThe process of removing salt and other minerals from seawater to produce fresh, drinkable water, typically using reverse osmosis or thermal distillation. plants if Tehran did not quickly reach a deal with Washington and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The threat, posted on social media, added water infrastructure to an already expanding list of civilian targets, including power plants and oil facilities. According to legal experts, carrying out that threat would constitute a civilian water war crime[s] under international law.
What Trump Threatened
In his post, Trump wrote that if a deal was “not shortly reached” and the Strait of Hormuz was not “immediately ‘Open for Business,'” the United States would conclude its military operations by “blowing up and completely obliterating” Iran’s electric plants, oil wells, Kharg Island, and “possibly all desalinization plants.” The White House responded that the administration would act “within the confines of the law”[s] while pursuing the objectives of Operation Epic Fury.
The threat came just three days after G7 foreign ministers, including U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio[s], signed a joint statement calling for “an immediate cessation of attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.”
Why This Would Be a Civilian Water War Crime
The civilian water war crime framework is built on specific rules that protect water infrastructure during armed conflict. The most important is Article 54 of Additional Protocol IA 1977 international treaty that expanded Geneva Convention protections to include civilian infrastructure essential for survival.[s] to the Geneva ConventionsA series of international treaties establishing humanitarian rules for the treatment of civilians, prisoners, and wounded in armed conflicts., adopted in 1977. It says: “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” Desalination plants fall squarely within that definition.
The Fourth Geneva Convention separately bans collective punishmentThe practice of punishing entire groups or populations for the actions of individuals, prohibited under international law.: “Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.” Using the destruction of water supplies to pressure a government into making a deal, as Trump’s threat explicitly proposed, fits that description. Yusra Suedi, an assistant professor in international law at the University of Manchester, told Al Jazeera[s] that the threat “reinforces the climate of impunity around collective punishment in warfare.”
Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch, put it bluntly: “Desalination plants are purely civilian infrastructure. There is no legal argument whatsoever for attacking them.”[s]
Why These Rules Exist
The civilian water war crime prohibitions were not theoretical when they were written. They emerged from real atrocities. The 1977 Additional Protocols were drafted in the aftermath of conflicts where civilian starvation and infrastructure destruction had caused massive suffering. The International Committee of the Red Cross has documented[s] how “to attack water is to attack an entire way of life,” noting that destroying drinking water in arid regions can force entire populations into exile.
The precedent that makes today’s threat most uncomfortable for the United States is its own history. During the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon knowingly degraded Iraq’s water treatment system[s] through sanctions. DeclassifiedGovernment documents or information previously kept secret that have been officially released to the public, often after a review process. Defense Intelligence Agency documents from January 1991 predicted that “Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water” and that “incidences of disease, including possible epidemics, will become probable.” The resulting public health crisis killed thousands of Iraqi civilians, primarily children.
As early as 1983, U.S. intelligence warned[s] that “disruption of desalination facilities in most of the Arab countries could have more serious consequences than the loss of any other industry or commodity.” That assessment has only become more true with time.
Who Would Be Hurt
Only about 3% of Iran’s potable water comes from desalination, meaning the impact on Iran itself would be concentrated on coastal communities and rural villages[s] that have few alternatives. Kaveh Madani, director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, said these communities “have struggled with having access to clean water during peacetime. During war times, things would be much more catastrophic and problematic.”
But the greater danger may be escalation. Gulf states depend on desalination far more than Iran does. Qatar gets 61% of its water from desalination, Bahrain 59%, and Kuwait 47%[s]. Iran has already threatened to retaliate against Gulf allies‘ water infrastructure if its own is targeted. One regional official told CNN[s], “It will be a huge catastrophe if they strike, we rely on desalination for almost all drinking water.”
Can Anyone Stop It?
Enforcing the civilian water war crime prohibition against the leader of a nuclear superpower is, in practice, extremely difficult. Robert Goldman, a law professor at American University who directs the War Crimes Research Office, said flatly[s]: “This is not an administration that in any way feels restrained by international law.”
But the civilian water war crime rules carry weight within the military chain of command too. Under both international and U.S. domestic law, military personnel have a duty to refuse unlawful orders. Rule 154 of customary international humanitarian lawThe body of law that governs armed conflict, setting rules to protect civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded. Also called the laws of war.[s] states this explicitly. Goldman predicted that any service member who refused an order to strike a desalination plant “would have pro bono counsel from former judge advocate generals under Republicans and Democrats alike.”
International law expert Gabor Rona told NPR[s] the threat constitutes a civilian water war crime “both under international and U.S. law.” The United States is not a member of the International Criminal Court, but as the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrated, non-membership does not guarantee immunity from international legal scrutiny.
President Trump’s March 30 threat to “blow up” Iran’s desalinationThe process of removing salt and other minerals from seawater to produce fresh, drinkable water, typically using reverse osmosis or thermal distillation. plants represents a significant escalation in the rhetoric of the U.S.-Iran conflict and a direct challenge to several interlocking provisions of international humanitarian lawThe body of law that governs armed conflict, setting rules to protect civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded. Also called the laws of war.. Carrying out the threat would constitute a civilian water war crime[s] under at least five distinct legal frameworks, each reinforcing the others.
The 5 Legal Provisions at Stake
1. Article 54 of Additional Protocol IA 1977 international treaty that expanded Geneva Convention protections to include civilian infrastructure essential for survival. (1977). This is the cornerstone provision. It prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,”[s] explicitly listing “drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” The prohibition applies “whatever the motive,” meaning it cannot be justified as leverage in negotiations. The only exception, imperative military necessity, applies only to objects within a party’s own territory.
2. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This prohibits collective punishmentThe practice of punishing entire groups or populations for the actions of individuals, prohibited under international law.: “Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.” Trump’s threat explicitly conditioned the destruction of civilian water infrastructure on Iran’s government agreeing to a deal, making it a textbook case of punishing a civilian population for the actions of its government. Yusra Suedi, an assistant professor in international law at the University of Manchester, identified this as “clearly an act of collective punishment.”[s]
3. The prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare (Article 54(1) AP I; Rule 53 of customary IHL). While typically associated with food, the ICRC has consistently interpreted[s] starvation broadly to include deprivation of clean water. Destroying desalination capacity in arid coastal regions would deprive communities of their primary water source, fitting the definition precisely.
4. The principle of distinctionThe fundamental rule of international humanitarian law requiring parties to distinguish between civilian and military targets during armed conflict. (Article 48 AP I; Rule 1 of customary IHL). Desalination plants are civilian objects. Marko Milanovic, professor of public international law at the University of Reading, stated[s] that unless a plant “supplies water only to a military base,” targeting it would be “manifestly unlawful.” Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch, was categorical[s]: “There is no legal argument whatsoever for attacking them.”
5. Customary international humanitarian law Rule 154. This establishes the duty of military personnel to refuse unlawful orders[s]. A strike order against civilian water infrastructure would trigger this obligation. Ioannis Kalpouzos, visiting professor of law at Harvard Law School, confirmed that “in U.S. domestic law, you have the same rule by implication, in that the obligations to obey orders only apply to lawful orders.”
Historical Context: Why the Rules Were Written
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva ConventionsA series of international treaties establishing humanitarian rules for the treatment of civilians, prisoners, and wounded in armed conflicts. codified protections that earlier conflicts had shown were urgently needed. The ICRC’s documentation of water attacks[s] across decades of armed conflict established that “to attack water is to attack an entire way of life,” noting that destroying water access in arid regions can “in very short order deprive the local population of an essential commodity.”
The United States’ own history illustrates why these protections matter. During the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon deliberately degraded Iraq’s water treatment capacity[s] through sanctions. DeclassifiedGovernment documents or information previously kept secret that have been officially released to the public, often after a review process. DIA documents from January 1991, titled “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities,” predicted that “Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water” and estimated it would “take at least six months before the system is fully degraded.” The resulting cholera, dysentery, and hepatitis epidemics killed thousands, disproportionately children. A 1983 U.S. intelligence report[s] had already warned that “disruption of desalination facilities in most of the Arab countries could have more serious consequences than the loss of any other industry or commodity.”
More recent precedents reinforce the pattern. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq destroyed much of Kuwait’s desalination capacity. Saudi-led coalition forces bombed desalination plants in Yemen in 2016-2017. Houthi forces targeted Saudi desalination facilities in 2019 and 2022. In each case, the civilian water war crime framework applied[s], even when enforcement was absent.
Strategic Asymmetry and Escalation Risk
The civilian water war crime question is further complicated by the strategic calculus of asymmetric dependency. Iran derives only about 3% of its potable water from desalination, concentrated in coastal communities[s]. But U.S. Gulf allies are far more exposed. Qatar derives 61% of its total water supply from desalination, Bahrain 59%, and Kuwait 47%[s]. For drinking water specifically, Qatar’s dependency exceeds 99%.
Iran has already signaled it would retaliate proportionally. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned[s] that “striking civilian infrastructure will not compel Iranians to surrender” and that Iran would respond in kind. The Qeshm Island desalination plant attack in early March, which Iran attributed to the U.S. and which cut water to 30 villages, and the subsequent Iranian drone strike on a Bahrain desalination facility, suggest the escalation spiral is already underway[s].
Gulf allies have privately urged restraint. CNN reported[s] that several countries “reiterated grave concerns to the Trump administration about any strikes on civilian infrastructure and the risk of an intensifying tit-for-tat escalation.” Andrew Friedman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that “if you threaten to do something that either could be or is a war crime, it frightens allies, because allies don’t want to be a part of something that could be a war crime.”
The Enforcement Gap
The civilian water war crime framework is legally unambiguous but practically unenforceable against major powers. Neither the U.S. nor Iran is a member of the International Criminal Court. Robert Goldman of American University’s War Crimes Research Office assessed[s] that “this is not an administration that in any way feels restrained by international law,” noting the difficulty of enforcing warrants against nuclear powers.
The contradictions are stark. The G7 statement signed by Secretary Rubio[s] three days before Trump’s threat called for “an immediate cessation of attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure” with “no justification” for deliberate targeting. The White House press secretary’s response, that the administration would act “within the confines of the law,” sat uneasily[s] next to the president’s explicit promise to “obliterate” civilian infrastructure.
The most meaningful check may be internal. International law expert Gabor Rona told NPR[s] the threat constitutes a civilian water war crime under both international and U.S. law. If ordered, the obligation falls to military commanders and operators to refuse. Goldman predicted they would find bipartisan legal support if they did. Whether that institutional pressure is enough to prevent the threat from becoming reality remains the open question as the war enters its fifth week.
