When a rising power begins to challenge an established one, the dominant power almost always responds the same way: containment. This containment policy pattern has repeated itself across five centuries, from the Hapsburgs facing the Ottoman Empire to the United States confronting the Soviet Union. Harvard researchers found that 12 of 16 such rivalries ended in war[s], suggesting the pattern is not merely coincidental but structural.
Winston Churchill articulated this logic in 1948: “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent.”[s] Britain shifted alliances repeatedly, siding with France against Spain, then with Spain against France, then with Prussia against France, then with France against Germany. The target changed; the containment policy pattern remained constant.
The Containment Policy Pattern in Modern History
The formal doctrine of containment emerged in 1947 when American diplomat George F. Kennan argued the United States should pursue “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”[s] Kennan called for countering Soviet pressure through “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.”[s]
This strategy became the foundation of American foreign policy for over four decades. By 1950, NSC-68 expanded it into a global military posture, arguing that the only plausible way to deter the Soviet Union was for President Truman to support “a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear arms.”[s] The United States almost tripled defense spending as a percentage of GDP between 1950 and 1953.
From Moscow to Beijing
The containment policy pattern is now being applied to China. American strategists openly advocate this approach: “US policy cannot change China’s behavior or ambitions, so it must focus on containing it,” argues the Foreign Policy Research Institute, recommending containment across “three critical power centers: geopolitical, military, and technological.”[s]
Chinese leaders see the pattern clearly. Xi Jinping has warned that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression of China.”[s] Chinese policymakers have concluded that “US containment of China had evolved into a bipartisan and institutionalised policy,” a permanent feature of Washington’s strategy rather than a temporary political gesture[s].
Why the Pattern Repeats
The containment policy pattern emerges from a basic structural reality: a dominant power has more to lose from change than to gain from it. When a rising power threatens to alter the existing order, the established power naturally seeks to preserve its position. The methods vary, from alliances to arms races to economic pressure, but the goal remains the same.
Harvard’s Graham Allison calls this the “Thucydides Trap,” after the ancient Greek historian who observed that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”[s] The Belfer Center’s research found that across 500 years, rising powers and ruling powers have clashed with remarkable consistency.
The British response to German naval expansion before World War I illustrates the pattern. Britain maintained the “two-power standard,” ensuring the Royal Navy was at least the size of the next two largest navies combined[s]. When Germany began building dreadnoughts under Admiral Tirpitz, Britain escalated in response. By 1906, Admiral Fisher declared Germany “the only probable enemy” and insisted the Royal Navy keep a force twice as powerful as Germany’s within striking distance[s].
The Limits of Containment
Whether the containment policy pattern will succeed against China as it did against the Soviet Union remains uncertain. Paul Heer, former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, notes that Kennan himself never thought containment applied to China[s]. Yet Heer acknowledges that Kennan “would essentially be advocating what the Chinese have chosen to call ‘containment'” if he were alive today.
The pattern persists because the underlying dynamics persist. Rising powers seek recognition and influence commensurate with their growing strength. Established powers seek to preserve the order that benefits them. Neither side is wrong in pursuing its interests, which is precisely why the collision is so difficult to avoid.
The regularity with which status quo powers respond to revisionist challengers through containment strategies suggests a structural dynamic rather than mere historical coincidence. This containment policy pattern has manifested across 16 major power transitions over five centuries, with Harvard’s Belfer Center documenting that 12 ended in armed conflict[s]. Understanding the mechanism requires examining both the strategic logic and the historical instantiations.
Churchill captured the essence of British grand strategy in 1948: “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent.”[s] This articulation reveals containment as a structural response to relative power shifts rather than an ideological commitment. Britain aligned with successive Continental powers against whichever state threatened hegemony, the containment policy pattern adapting to each configuration while remaining constant in purpose.
The Containment Policy Pattern: Institutional Codification
George Kennan’s 1947 X-Article formalized containment as explicit doctrine, calling for “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies“[s] through “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.”[s] Kennan conceived containment as primarily political and economic, defending major industrial centers: Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.
NSC-68 transformed this into a militarized global posture. The 1950 document argued that “the only plausible way to deter the Soviet Union was for President Harry Truman to support a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear arms.”[s] Kennan himself opposed this expansion, arguing that containment would only succeed if the United States created “political and economic conditions in the free world” sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from a military solution.[s] The Korean War resolved the debate in favor of militarization.
Application to Sino-American Competition
Contemporary American strategy toward China exhibits the containment policy pattern with increasing explicitness. The Foreign Policy Research Institute advocates focusing “containment strategy on three critical power centers: geopolitical, military, and technological,” arguing that the “United States should aim to ‘win’ the competition with China in the same way it prevailed in its last great power competition: by managing it.”[s]
Chinese strategic assessments have incorporated this analysis. Xi Jinping warned that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression of China.”[s] Chinese policymakers concluded that “US containment of China had evolved into a bipartisan and institutionalised policy,” prompting strategic preparations including technological self-sufficiency, industrial consolidation, and counterleverage development[s].
Structural Dynamics and the Thucydides Trap
Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” framework posits that “when a great power’s position as hegemon is threatened by an emerging power, there is a significant likelihood of war between the two powers.”[s] The framework draws on Thucydides’ observation that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
The Anglo-German naval race exemplifies the containment policy pattern in its arms-race variant. Britain maintained the “two-power standard,” ensuring the Royal Navy was “at least the size of the next two largest navies combined.”[s] Germany’s 1898 and 1900 Fleet Acts, designed to create a “risk fleet” sufficient to deter British action, triggered escalation. By 1906, Fisher identified Germany as “the only probable enemy” and insisted on maintaining a 2:1 superiority.[s]
Kennan’s Exclusion of China and Contemporary Ironies
Paul Heer, former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, documents that “Kennan did not consider his original concept of containment to be applicable to China.”[s] Kennan explicitly excluded mainland East Asia, including Korea and Indochina, on grounds that Chinese communists would not fall under Soviet control and that China posed neither strategic importance nor military threat. Only Japan merited containment as “the East Asian counterpart to Germany in Europe.”
Yet Heer argues Kennan evolved: by 1960, he asserted it was a vital U.S. interest to erect “firm barriers” against “contemporary Chinese imperialism” and prevent “the major archipelagos and islands lying off the coast of East Asia” from exploitation by hostile forces. This, Heer concludes, is “precisely the goal and the set of U.S. policies which Chinese leaders today routinely characterize as ‘containment.'” The disagreement is semantic; the containment policy pattern is operative regardless of its label.
Structural Persistence
The recurrence of the containment policy pattern across centuries and contexts suggests it emerges from the anarchic structure of the international system itself. Status quo powers rationally seek to preserve favorable distributions of power; rising powers rationally seek recognition and influence commensurate with their capabilities. Neither position is inherently illegitimate, which explains why the collision proves so difficult to manage peacefully.
Whether this iteration ends in accommodation or conflict depends not on recognizing the pattern but on whether either side can credibly commit to restraint. Historically, such commitments have proven elusive. The pattern persists because the incentives that generate it persist.
