Civil Asset Forfeiture: How Police Seize Billions Without Criminal Charges

What Civil Asset ForfeitureA legal process in which the government sues and seizes property it suspects is connected to criminal activity, without requiring a criminal conviction. The owner must prove the property is innocent of wrongdoing. Is and How It Works

Civil asset forfeiture is a legal process in which the government sues a piece of property rather than a person. The case is filed “in remA Latin legal term meaning 'against a thing.' In rem proceedings sue property itself, not a person, which strips away criminal constitutional protections like the right to counsel and presumption of innocence.,” a Latin legal term meaning “against a thing.” This produces case names that read like absurdist fiction: United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, United States v. One Pearl Necklace.

This is not a stylistic quirk. It is the structural foundation of the entire system. Because the lawsuit targets property, not a person, the constitutional protections that apply in criminal proceedings (the right to an attorney, the presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) do not apply. The property has no rights. The owner is, legally, a third party.

Here is how it typically works. A law enforcement officer encounters cash or property during a traffic stop, a search, or an investigation. The officer determines, based on their own judgment, that the property is connected to criminal activity. The property is seized. The government then files a civil action to keep it. The owner, if they want their property back, must hire an attorney (at their own expense), file a claim, and prove that the property is “innocent,” meaning it was not involved in or derived from illegal activity.

The burden of proof the government must meet to keep seized property is, in most cases, “preponderance of the evidenceA legal standard of proof meaning 'more likely than not' or 51%. It is the lowest standard used in American courts and is applied in most civil asset forfeiture cases, far lower than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard for criminal convictions..” That is the lowest standard used in American courts. It means “more likely than not,” or colloquially, 51%. By comparison, criminal convictions require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” a far higher bar. Some states set the bar even lower than preponderance, requiring only “probable causeThe legal standard requiring police to have reasonable, factual grounds to believe a specific person committed a crime before making an arrest or obtaining a warrant.” to complete a forfeiture. This mirrors the low evidentiary standards prosecutors enjoy in other contexts: grand juries approve 99.99% of indictments that prosecutors bring, creating a system where government legal proceedings face minimal oversight.

Criminal Forfeiture vs. Civil Forfeiture

Criminal forfeiture exists too, and most people assume that is how the system works. Under criminal forfeiture, the government can seize property only after convicting someone of a crime. The forfeiture is part of the sentence. This is what most people picture when they hear the word “forfeiture”: a drug lord’s mansion being seized after conviction.

Civil forfeiture skips the conviction requirement entirely. The government need not prove that anyone committed a crime, only that the property itself is probably connected to one. The distinction matters: under civil forfeiture, a person can be found not guilty of every charge (or never charged at all) and still permanently lose their property.

The Scale of the System

The Institute for Justice’s third edition of “Policing for Profit,” the largest dataset ever compiled on American forfeiture practices, found that governments have forfeited at least $68.8 billion since 2000. Of that total, approximately $46 billion was forfeited under federal law and over $23 billion under state law, according to IJ’s analysis of data from the Department of Justice and 45 state reporting systems.

Federal forfeiture revenue has grown dramatically. The Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund took in $27 million in 1985. By 1993, that figure had risen to $556 million. By 2012, it reached $4.2 billion in a single year, according to DOJ’s own reporting.

The proceeds go directly to law enforcement. Federal law and most state laws allow agencies to keep some or all of the forfeiture revenue they generate. This creates a direct financial incentive to seize property, a structural conflict of interest that critics describe as “policing for profit.” Similar problematic incentive structures exist throughout American institutions: pharmaceutical pricing allows middlemen to profit from higher drug costs, creating financial incentives that work against public health.

Why It Disproportionately Affects People With Less Money

Data from 21 states analyzed by the Institute for Justice shows that half of all currency forfeitures involve amounts worth less than $1,300. In Michigan, the median value of property seized was $423. In Pennsylvania, it was $369.

These are not the seizures of drug kingpins. They are the seizures of people carrying modest amounts of cash.

The economics of challenging a forfeiture make recovery impractical for small amounts. Hiring an attorney costs more than the seized property is worth. Filing deadlines are short (often 30 to 35 days). Missing a deadline means forfeiting the property automatically. Many people, especially those without legal resources, simply walk away.

The system also has a documented racial dimension. An ACLU analysis of Department of Justice and U.S. Census Bureau data found that half of all federal “equitable sharingA federal program that allows state and local police to partner with federal agencies on investigations and receive up to 80% of resulting forfeiture proceeds, even in states that have restricted civil forfeiture.” payments went to law enforcement agencies policing communities where more than 70% of residents are people of color, according to the ACLU’s 2016 report on forfeiture and communities of color. In Philadelphia, before the city reformed its forfeiture program in 2018, 63% of cash forfeitures involved money taken from Black residents, who made up 43% of the population, according to the ACLU of Pennsylvania. In South Carolina, between 2014 and 2016, 65% of individuals targeted for forfeiture were Black men, who represent 13% of the state’s population, according to a study highlighted by the Southern Poverty Law Center.

The Legal Mechanism: In RemA Latin legal term meaning 'against a thing.' In rem proceedings sue property itself, not a person, which strips away criminal constitutional protections like the right to counsel and presumption of innocence. Proceedings

Civil asset forfeitureA legal process in which the government sues and seizes property it suspects is connected to criminal activity, without requiring a criminal conviction. The owner must prove the property is innocent of wrongdoing. operates through in rem proceedings, a legal framework in which the government files suit against the property itself rather than its owner. The distinction is not semantic. Because the defendant is the property, not a person, the proceeding is classified as civil, not criminal. This classification strips away the procedural protections that would otherwise apply: no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, no presumption of innocence, no requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

This produces case captions that would be comic if the stakes were not real: United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, United States v. One Pearl Necklace. The property owner enters the case as a “claimant,” a third party asserting an interest in the property the government seeks to keep.

The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidenceA legal standard of proof meaning 'more likely than not' or 51%. It is the lowest standard used in American courts and is applied in most civil asset forfeiture cases, far lower than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard for criminal convictions. in most federal cases (codified by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000) and in many states. Some states still operate under a lower standard: probable causeThe legal standard requiring police to have reasonable, factual grounds to believe a specific person committed a crime before making an arrest or obtaining a warrant., the same threshold police need to make an arrest. In practical terms, the government must show only that it is slightly more likely than not that the property is connected to criminal activity to keep it permanently. This low standard reflects a broader pattern in prosecutorial proceedings: grand juries rubber-stamp 99.99% of prosecutor requests, demonstrating how legal mechanisms can be structured to minimize meaningful oversight of government power.

The Financial Architecture: Who Keeps the Money

The structural incentive problem in civil forfeiture is straightforward. Under federal law and most state laws, the agencies that seize property keep the proceeds. The Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund grew from $27 million in 1985 to $4.2 billion in 2012, according to DOJ reports. The total forfeited since 2000 across all reporting jurisdictions exceeds $68.8 billion, with approximately $46 billion at the federal level and over $23 billion at the state level, according to the Institute for Justice’s “Policing for Profit” (third edition), the largest forfeiture dataset ever compiled, covering 17 million data points across 45 states and the federal government.

The federal “equitable sharingA federal program that allows state and local police to partner with federal agencies on investigations and receive up to 80% of resulting forfeiture proceeds, even in states that have restricted civil forfeiture.” program amplifies this. Created by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, equitable sharing allows state and local police to collaborate with federal agencies on investigations and receive up to 80% of the resulting forfeiture proceeds. This creates a bypass mechanism: in states that have reformed their own forfeiture laws (requiring a conviction, for instance), local police can hand cases to federal authorities, who operate under federal forfeiture rules, and receive the proceeds through equitable sharing. The DOJ’s own guidelines describe the program as “enhancing cooperation” between federal, state, and local law enforcement, though critics note it effectively allows agencies to circumvent state-level protections.

An ACLU analysis of Department of Justice and U.S. Census Bureau data found that half of all federal equitable sharing payments went to agencies policing communities where more than 70% of residents are people of color, and more than 85% went to agencies in communities where people of color comprise more than half the population, according to the ACLU’s 2016 report.

The Small-Seizure Problem

The Institute for Justice’s data from 21 states shows that the median currency forfeiture is worth less than $1,300. In Michigan, the median was $423. In Pennsylvania, $369. These figures come from IJ’s analysis of state-level forfeiture reporting data.

The economics of contesting a forfeiture make this significant. An attorney’s retainer alone typically exceeds the value of what was seized. Filing deadlines are short, usually 30 to 35 days, and the process requires navigating civil procedure. Missing a deadline results in default judgment: the government keeps the property automatically. For someone living paycheck to paycheck, the rational economic decision is to abandon the claim, even if the seizure was unjustified.

This is not speculation. In Philadelphia, before the city reformed its forfeiture practices following a class-action lawsuit settled in 2018, the system had ensnared approximately 30,000 residents, disproportionately Black and low-income, according to reporting by the ACLU of Pennsylvania. The ACLU found that 63% of cash forfeitures involved money taken from Black residents, who made up 43% of the city’s population. Of those forfeitures, 71% were completed without a criminal conviction.

In South Carolina, between 2014 and 2016, 65% of individuals targeted for forfeiture were Black men, despite comprising 13% of the state’s population, according to a study highlighted by the Southern Poverty Law Center. In Las Vegas, the Nevada Policy Research Institute found that 66% of 346 forfeiture cases in 2016 occurred in just 12 of 48 zip codes, all predominantly minority and low-income neighborhoods.

Constitutional Guardrails and Their Limits

The Supreme Court has placed some constraints on forfeiture, though none that fundamentally alter its structure. In Austin v. United States (1993), the Court held that civil forfeiture can constitute punishment and therefore must comply with the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. In United States v. Bajakajian (1998), the Court struck down a forfeiture as “grossly disproportional” to the underlying offense. And in Timbs v. Indiana (2019), the Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local governments, not just the federal government.

These decisions establish that forfeitures cannot be wildly disproportionate. They do not require a criminal conviction. They do not shift the burden of proof. They do not address the financial incentive structure. The core mechanism remains intact.

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) introduced some federal procedural protections: an innocent owner defenseA legal protection introduced by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 that allows property owners to argue their property should not be forfeited. The burden of proof rests on the owner, not the government., a right to appointed counsel for some claimants, and a shift to preponderance of the evidence as the standard. But CAFRA applies only to federal cases, and the innocent owner defense places the burden on the owner to prove their own innocence, inverting the presumption that normally governs American legal proceedings.

Reform: Uneven and Incomplete

Since 2014, 37 states and the District of Columbia have reformed their civil forfeiture laws in some form, according to the Institute for Justice. The reforms vary widely. Sixteen states now require a criminal conviction before property can be forfeited civilly. Four states (Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Maine) have abolished civil forfeiture entirely, permitting only criminal forfeiture following a conviction.

Washington State passed HB 1440, effective January 2026, which subjects forfeitures to the Service Members’ Civil Relief Act and adds procedural requirements. Minnesota has considered legislation to establish a $1,500 minimum threshold for forfeitable property. At the federal level, Senators Rand Paul and Cory Booker introduced the Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act in January 2025, which would raise the federal burden of proof, limit equitable sharing, and require a criminal conviction for most forfeitures.

The equitable sharing loophole complicates state-level reform. Even in states that require a conviction for state forfeiture, local police can route cases through federal channels and receive forfeiture proceeds under federal rules. Until federal law changes, state reforms have an escape hatch built in.

What the Data Shows and What It Does Not

The $68.8 billion figure from the Institute for Justice is the best available estimate but comes with caveats. Five states did not provide usable data. Many states do not require itemized reporting of individual forfeitures. The figure includes both currency and non-currency assets (vehicles, real estate), and valuation methods vary across jurisdictions.

What the data does show clearly: the system generates billions for law enforcement, targets small amounts of cash, disproportionately affects communities of color, and operates with weaker procedural protections than virtually any other legal mechanism by which the government takes private property. Whether this constitutes a feature or a bug depends on whom you ask. The people whose $423 was taken and never returned are generally not ambivalent about the answer.